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We examine the behavior of the skill premium in a two-country general equilibrium 
growth  model  assuming  (i)  technological-knowledge  diffusion;  (ii)  internal  costly 
investment  in  both  physical  capital  and  R&D;  and  (iii)  complementarities  between 
intermediate goods in production. We find that these three economic features affect the 
steady-state growth rate in both countries. However, only in the imitator country do they 
influence the skill premium. We also find that the steady-state skill premium in the 
innovator country is affected by its relative labor productivity rather than by its relative 
labor endowments. This result contrasts with most skill-biased technological change 
models and suggests that the sustained increase in the skill premium observed in several 
developed countries over the last three decades may have been due to increases in the 
relative productive advantage of skilled labor. 
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1. Introduction 
With  this  paper,  we  analyze  theoretically  the  skill  premium  behavior  in  an  economic 
environment characterized by  a two-country skill-biased technological-change model with 
vertical  differentiation  and  three  assumptions:  (i)  technological-knowledge  diffusion;  (ii) 
internal  costly  investment  in  both  physical  capital  and  R&D;  and  (iii)  complementarities 
between intermediate goods in production.  
Building on Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), and introducing vertical differentiation as 
in Aghion and Howitt (1992), our baseline framework is an R&D-based growth model, in 
which  perfectly  competitive  final  goods  are  produced  with  labor  and  quality-adjusted 
intermediate goods, whose productions under monopolistic competition requires innovation. 
New designs are obtained through vertical R&D. Each final good is produced by one of two 
technologies: one that uses skilled labor and skilled-specific intermediate inputs; the other 
uses unskilled labor and unskilled-specific intermediate goods. 
Following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997), we develop our baseline framework, into a 
two-country  model  with  technological-knowledge  diffusion.  In  the  innovator  (developed) 
country,  firms  involved  in  R&D  undertake  innovative  research.  In  the  imitator  (less 
developed) country, firms involved in R&D undertake imitative research. The two countries 
differ in (i) productivity levels; (ii) labor endowments; (iii) R&D capacity; and (iv) technological-
knowledge levels. In the absence of international trade, technological-knowledge diffusion 
between countries is assumed to occur as a result of, for example, international mobility of 
students (Park, 2004; Le, 2010) or communication patterns (Keller, 2003; Wong, 2004). 
Following  Thompson  (2008),  we  introduce  two  additional  assumptions:  (1)  total 
investment in both physical capital and R&D requires internal adjustment costs, specified as 
in Hayashi (1982); and (2) intermediate goods are complementary to each other in final goods 
production, in an Evans et al.’s (1998) specification. 3 
 
We examine the impact of (i) technological-knowledge diffusion; (ii) internal costly 
investment,  and  (iii)  complementarities,  on  the  technological-knowledge  bias,  the  skill 
premium, and economic growth in both countries. We find that the three introduced economic 
features  affect  the  growth  rate  in  both  countries.  In  particular,  technological-knowledge 
diffusion  and  the  complementarities  degree  influence  growth  positively,  whereas  costly 
investment affects growth negatively. We also find that only in the imitator country do these 
three assumptions affect the skill premium and the technological-knowledge bias. 
Further, we analyze the effects on the skill premium of an increase in the skilled labor 
relative supply in the innovator country. An important feature of wage patterns in several 
developed countries, over the last three decades, has been the simultaneous rise in both the 
skilled labor relative supply and the skill premium As Richardson (1995), He and Liu (2008), 
among  others,  review,  the  skill-biased  technological-change  theory  is  the  most  accepted 
approach for explaining such pattern. Wishing to contribute theoretically to the academic 
debate on this important question, we find that the skilled labor relative supply has a positive 
impact on the growth rate, but does not affect the equilibrium skill premium. In the proposed 
model, the steady-state skill premium depends solely on the productivity levels of each type 
of  labor.  Our  model  suggests  that  the  sustained  increase  in  the  skill  premium  in  several 
developed countries may not be related to increases in skilled labor relative supply, rather it 
may be linked to increases in skilled labor’s productive advantage. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. We set up the model in Section 2 
and derive the equilibrium in Section 3. In Section 4, we analyze the impact of the three 
introduced assumptions on the equilibrium variables. Concluding Remarks in Section 5 bring 
closure to the paper. 
 
2. The Model 
2.1. Consumption Side 4 
 
Each  country  is  populated  by  a  time-invariant  number  of  heterogeneous  households  who 
supply labor, consume final goods and own firms. They are endowed with ability level  a∈
[0,1] and supply one of two types of labor: unskilled, La, if  a a ≤ , and skilled, Ha, if  a>a . 
The amounts of both types of labor, L and H, are fixed. We assume that the innovator country 
is relatively more abundant in skilled labor; that is,  I I P P H L H L > , where indexes I and P 
represent the innovator and the imitator countries, respectively. All households have identical 

















U t e dt   (1) 
where Ca(t) is household a’s consumption at time t, ρ is the subjective discount rate, and θ is 
the relative risk aversion parameter. Each household’s budget constraint equalizes income to 
consumption plus savings. Savings consist of accumulation of financial assets, E, with return 
r, in the form of ownership of intermediate goods firms. Each firms’ value corresponds to its 
respective patent’s value. Each household’s budget constraint is: 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) = + − &
a a M a a E t r t E t w t M t C t , where  { } , M L H =   (2) 
Household a maximizes function (1) subject to equation (2). The solution, independent 
of the individual, is the Standard Euler equation: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
a
a
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  (3) 
2.2. Final Goods Sector 
Building on Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), in country Z,  { } , Z I F = , the final goods sector is 
composed by competitive firms indexed by  Z n ∈[0,1]. Two substitute production technologies 
are available in each country. The unskilled technology - L-technology - uses unskilled labor 
combined with a continuum of unskilled-specific intermediate goods indexed by  j∈[0, JL,Z]. 
The skilled technology - H-technology - uses skilled labor combined with a continuum of 
skilled-specific  intermediate  goods  indexed  by  j∈[0,  JH,Z].  Intermediate  goods  enter 5 
 
complementarily in the production function, following Thompson (2008), in an Evans et al. 
(1998) specification. The output of firm n in country Z at time t,  ( ) , n Z Y t , is given by: 
( ) ( ) ( )
, ,
, , , , 1 1 ( ) ( )
, , , , , , , , ,
0 0
(1 ) ( ) ( )
φ φ
γ γ α α − −             = − +          
           
∫ ∫
L Z H Z
j L Z j H Z
J J
k t k t
n Z Z Z n Z n j L Z Z n Z n j H Z Y t A n lL q x t dj n hH q x t dj   (4) 
Variable AZ is an exogenous constant representing each country’s level of productivity, 
considered  dependent  on  a  country’s  institutions  such  as  property  rights,  tax  laws  and 
government services. Given the general perception that institutions are of better quality in 
developed countries, which are more innovative, we assume that AI > AF. 
The  contribution  of  intermediate  goods  to  production  is  represented  by  expressions 
within square brackets. Under the Schumpeterian tradition, firm n’s output depends on the 
quantity of the M-type intermediate good j,  , , , ( ) n j M Z x t , adjusted by quality. The size of each 
quality upgrade obtained with each successful R&D is denoted by constant q>1. The quality 
ladder rungs are indexed by k, with a higher value of k denoting a higher quality. As in 
Thompson  (2008),  we  impose  two  parameter  restrictions:  γφ α = ,  so  as  to  have  constant 
returns to scale; and  1 φ > , so that intermediate goods are complementary to one another, i.e., 
so that an increase in the quantity of each j increases the marginal productivity of the others. 
Expressions  with  exponent  (1 α)  represent  the  contribution  of  labor  inputs  to 
production. Variables Ln,Z and Hn,Z   are the amounts of, respectively, unskilled and skilled 
labor,  while  parameters  l  and  h  stand  for,  respectively,  unskilled  and  skilled  labor’s 
productivity. Two productive advantages are here assumed. Firstly, we assume that 1 h l > ≥ , 
which  constitutes  an  absolute  productivity  advantage  of  skilled  over  unskilled  labor. 
Secondly, terms (1 n) and n imply that unskilled (skilled) labor is relatively more productive 
with lower (higher) index final goods. The use of these adjustment terms also implies the 
existence of an endogenous threshold final good,  ( ) Z n t , such that final goods  [ ] 0, ( ) ∈ Z Z n n t  6 
 
are  produced  exclusively  under  the  L-technology,  whereas  final  goods  [ ] ( ),1 ∈ Z Z n n t   are 
produced solely under the H-technology. 
Normalizing to one the price of the composite final good,  Z Y , and naming  , ( ) n Z P t  the 
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Z n Z n Z Y t P t Y t dn e   (5) 
The  demand  for  the  M-type  intermediate  good  j  by  each  final  goods  firm  can  be 
obtained from its profit maximization problem: 
, ,
, , ,
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ( )
0 0
max ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
L Z H Z
n j M Z
J J
n Z n Z j L Z n j L Z j H Z n j H Z L Z n Z H Z n Z x t P t Y t R t x t dj R t x t dj w t L w t H − − − − ∫ ∫   
where  , , j M Z R  is the price of the M-type j, and  , M Z w  is the wage paid for each unit of the M-
type labor. The existence of a threshold final good means that each final good producer uses 
only  one  type  of  technology,  thus  profits  are  maximized  in  order  to  either  , , , ( ) n j L Z x t   or 
, , , ( ) n j H Z x t . The demand for intermediate goods by the n
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  (7) 
Rewriting  equations  (6)  and  (7)  with  respect  to  ( )
, , ( )
, , , ( )
j L Z k t




, , ( )
, , , ( )
j H Z k t
n j H Z q x t
γ
and integrating both sides of the resulting expressions, we get: 
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Plugging these two equations into equation (4), the supply of the final good n in Z is: 
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 is a positive constant and  , ( ) L Z Q t  and  , ( ) H Z Q t  are two aggregate quality 
indexes measuring technological-knowledge in each range of intermediate goods, defined by: 
, ,




( ) and ( )
γ γ
γ γ − −    
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L Z H Z Q t q dj Q t q dj 
2.3. Intermediate Goods Sector 
Under  monopolistic  competition,  intermediate  firms  produce  quality-adjusted  intermediate 
goods to supply final-good firms. A wide variety of intermediate goods being produced in the 
economy, at each t, total production of each variety is provided by one firm alone – the one 
that uses the top quality. This Schumpeterian leadership is temporary, as the top quality is 
subject  to  destruction  by  new  qualities  resulting  from  successful  innovation  (in  Z=I)  or 
imitation  (in  Z=F)  by  potential  entrants  (e.g.,  Segerstrom  et.  al.,  1990;  Grossman  and 
Helpman, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, Ch. 7). 
Production in the intermediate-goods sector requires both physical capital and R&D 
capital. We assume that it takes one unit of physical capital to produce one physical unit of 
each intermediate good j. Thus the physical-capital stock in each t is given by the amount of 
intermediate goods produced in the economy,  ( ) Z X t . R&D capital is required to invent new 
designs that lead to better quality intermediate goods. The R&D capital isΩ ( ). Total capital 
is K (t) = X (t) + Ω (t). 
Following  Thompson  (2008),  we  consider  that  total  investment,    ( ) =    ( ) =
   ( ) + Ω   ( ),  involves an internal cost. With zero capital depreciation, installing  ( ) Z I t  new 
units of total capital, requires spending an amount given by: 
 
2 ( ) 1







C t I t
K t
  (9) 8 
 
where 






ϕ  represents the Hayashi’s (1982) installation cost, with  0 ϕ >  standing for the 
adjustment  cost  parameter.  The  Hamiltonian  is  chosen  so  as  to  maximize  the  present 
discounted value of cash flows. The current-value Hamiltonian is: 
 
2 ( ) 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 ( )
ϕ   = − − + −  
& z
Z z z z z z
z
I t
H t Y t I t a t I t K t
K t
   
where  ( ) Z a t  is the capital market value.  
As we will see later on, in steady state,  ( ) Z X t and  Z(t )    grow at the same constant 
rate, which is equal to the output-growth rate, g, common to both countries. Hence,  ( ) Z K t  also 
grows at the rate g. This means that aggregate output is a linear function of total capital. 
Recalling that  ( )/ ( ) ( )/ ( ) = = &
z Z Z Z I t K t K t K t g , the first order condition of the optimal control 
problem says that, in steady state: 
  1 a g ϕ = +   (10) 
 
Facing an aggregate demand given by
1
, , , , ,
0
( ) ( ) j M Z n j M Z X t x t dn =∫ , each intermediate good 
firm’s maximization problem is: 
 
, ,
, , , , , , ( )
max ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
j M Z
j M Z j M Z Z j M Z R t
R t X t ar t X t −   (11) 
where  ( ) Z ar t is the production cost of one unit of j. This problem leads to the mark-up price 









R t   (12) 
Since the leader firm is the only one legally allowed to produce the top quality, it will 
use pricing to wipe out sales of lower quality. The lowest price that the closest follower can 
charge without negative profits is  ( ) Z ar t . Hence, the leader can capture the entire market by 
selling  at  a  price  slightly  below  ( ) Z qar t   ,  as  q  is  the  quality  advantage  over  the  closest 
follower. Thus, q is also an indicator of the incumbent’s market power. The limit price is: 9 
 
  , ( ) ( ) j Z Z R t qar t =   (13) 
Depending on whether  qγ  is greater or lesser than  ( ) Z ar t , the leader firm will opt for 
either the monopoly pricing or the limit pricing. Like, e.g., Grossman and Helpman (1991a, 
Ch. 4), we assume that the limit pricing strategy is binding, used by all firms. 
 
2.4. R&D Sector 
R&D activities constitute the search for new designs that lead to  a higher quality of the 
existing intermediate  goods.  In each intermediate  goods industry, only  entrants undertake 
R&D and the innovation/imitation process follows a Poisson process. Patent value depends on 
the profit-yields accrued by the monopolist at each t, and on the monopoly’s duration. The 
monopoly’s  duration  depends  on  the  probability  of  successful  R&D.  The  instantaneous 
probability of successful innovation (in Z=I) or imitation (in Z=F) at t in the next quality 
intermediate good j, which complements the M-type labor,  , , ( ) j M Z pb t , is:  
( ) ( )
( )
, , , ,
( ) ( ) ( ) 1/(1 ) 1
, , , , , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Z
P M j M Z j M Z P P
Q t k t k t PE IT
j M Z j M Z Z Z M Z P M pb t t q q Q t e f Q t
σ γ ε ω β ζ
Γ
− − + − −         =        
%
%   (14) 
Where: (i) , , ( ) j M Z t ω  is R&D capital in j, which defines the framework as a lab-equipment 
model; (ii) 
, , ( ) j M Z k t
Zq β  represents learning-by-R&D in j, (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1991, 
Ch. 12).  βZ  is the positive coefficient on past successful R&D experience and we assume that 
0 F I β β < < , i.e. there are greater learning effects in country F. Moreover, for j, 
, , ( ) j M Z k t q  is the 
highest quality level attained by innovation or imitation. Producers in F are only required to 
imitate technologies on one quality rung above the current level, since they only sell the 
imitated intermediate goods domestically, hence  I F k k ≥ ; (iii) 
( ) , , ( ) 1/(1 ) 1
, ( )
j M Z k t
Z M Z q Q t
γ ε ζ
− − − −
 is the 
adverse effect caused by the increasing complexity of quality improvements (e.g. Kortum, 
1997). For a given M-type j, the complexity cost increases not only with the quality rung, 
, , ( ) j M Z k t q ,  but  also,  given  complementarities  between  intermediate  goods,  with  the  average 10 
 
quality of all M-type intermediate goods,  , ( ) M Z Q t . The positive learning effect 
, , ( ) β
j M Z k t
Zq  is 
modeled  in  such  a  way  that,  together  with  the  complexity  cost 
( ) , , ( ) 1/(1 ) 1
, ( )
γ ε ζ
− − − − j M Z k t
Z M Z q Q t , 
totally offset the positive influence of the quality rung on the profits of each j firm, as can be 
seen below. This is the technical reason for the presence of the parameters γ  and ε  in term 
( ) , , ( ) 1/(1 ) 1
, ( )
γ ε ζ
− − − − j M Z k t
Z M Z q Q t . This term further includes a country-firm specific fixed research 
cost,  ζ Z ,  which,  in  line  with  several  authors  (e.g.  Mansfield  et.  al.,  1981),  is  higher  for 
innovation  than  for  imitation,  0 I F ζ ζ > > ;  (iv)  ( )
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is  the  catching-up 
term, specific to the imitator country – hence  0, 1 I F Γ = Γ =  – that sums up two important 
determinants of the imitation probability: the imitation capacity (i.e., the capacity to learn, 
assimilate and implement advanced technologies), and the backwardness effect (according to 
which the successful imitation rate is an increasing function of the gap between F and I).  F PE  
and  F IT  are two positive exogenous variables that capture important determinants of imitation 
capacity, namely domestic policies promoting R&D (e.g., Aghion et al., 2001) and openness 
to international trade (e.g., Coe et al., 1997). The benefits of relative backwardness, in turn, 
are captured by function ( ) ( ) F M f Q t % , which, in line with Papageorgiu (2002), is equal to: 
( ) 2
0 , 0 ( )
( )




if Q t d
f Q t
Q t d Q t d if d Q t
 < ≤  = 
− + + − < <  
%
%
% % %  
where  , , ( ) ( )/ ( ) 1 M M F M I Q t Q t Q t ≡ < %  is the relative technological-knowledge of the imitator’s 
M-specific  intermediate  goods,  measuring  the  technological-knowledge  gap  between 
countries. If the gap is not too large, i.e.  ( ) %
M Q t  is above threshold d, country F can benefit 
from a backwardness advantage, as in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1997). When  ( ) M Q t %
 is below 
d, backwardness is no longer an advantage. Technological-knowledge is diffused only up to a 
certain point: Country F can grow rapidly only if an adequate minimum of development base 11 
 
is initially present. Function  ( ) ( ) F M f Q t %
 
is quadratic over the range of main interest and, once 
affected  by  the  exponent,  ( ) ( ) ( ) F M M Q t Q t σ σ = − + % % ,  yields  an  increasing  backwardness 
advantage.  Above  threshold  d,  the  higher  the  gap,  the  higher  the  imitation  probability, 
consequently the faster the technological-knowledge progress and growth. 
The experience-adjusted probability of successful R&D being: 
  ( )
( ) ( ) 1
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+ −   Φ ≡    
%
%   (15) 
equation (14) can be rewritten as 
 
( ) , , ( ) /(1 )
, , , , , , ( ) ( ). ( ). ( )
j M Z k t
j M Z j M Z M Z M Z pb t t t q Q t
γ γ ε ω
− − − = Φ   (16) 
 
3. Equilibrium 
Let us derive the equilibrium. Firstly, for a given technological-knowledge bias, i.e., for given 
aggregate quality indexes  , ( ) L Z Q t  and  , ( ) H Z Q t , we obtain equilibrium values for the threshold 
final good, final-good prices, aggregate output and physical capital, and wages. Secondly, we 
derive the equilibrium values for successful R&D probability, aggregate R&D capital, and the 
technological-knowledge path. The steady state in both countries in then characterized. 
 
3.1. Equilibrium for a given Technological Knowledge Bias 
Threshold Final Good 
As  mentioned  above,  there  is  and  endogenous  threshold  final  good,  ( ) Z n t ,  such  that  the 
production of final goods  [ ] 0, ( ) ∈ Z Z n n t  uses only the L-technology, whereas the production of 
final goods  [ ] ( ),1 ∈ Z Z n n t  uses only the H-technology. Then production function (8) is: 
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Taking into account that, in each period, we have 12 
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after replacing  , , ( ) j M Z R t  by (13), equation (17) becomes: 
 
1 1




, 1 1 1
,
( )



















   − ≤ <       = 
    ≤ ≤  
   
L Z




Z Z Z H Z Z Z
Z
P t




n A hH Q t if n n
qar t
  (4) 
Both expressions in (19) must hold for  = Z Z n n , for which a firm using the L-technology 
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where  , , ˆ ( ) ( )/ ( ) z H Z L Z Q t Q t Q t ≡  is the technological-knowledge bias in Z. In line with previous 
considerations, we assume that  ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ) I F Q t Q t > . 
Final Good Prices 
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Macroeconomic Aggregates 
Using equations (19), (20), (23) and (24) in (5), we rewrite Y as a function of technological-
knowledge levels: 
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Next, we rewrite equation (4) with respect to ( )
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we rewrite X as a function of the technological-knowledge level: 
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Integrating these two equations in n, each intermediate firm’s output is: 
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Integrating these two equations in j, we obtain X as a function of  L Q and  H Q : 
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Wages 
Deriving production function (26) with respect to L and H, wages are: 
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Equation (32) says that the skill premium,  ˆ ( ) Z W t  is greater when: (i) h is greater; (ii) 
/ Z Z L H is lower; and (iii)  ˆ
z Q  is higher.  
 
3.2. Equilibrium R&D 
Monopoly Profit Explicit Flow and Duration 
Each  intermediate  firm’s  expected  profits  current  value,  , , , ( ) k j M Z V t ,  depends  on  profits, 
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Equilibrium Probability of Successful R&D and R&D Capital 15 
 
Under free-entry R&D equilibrium, expected returns match spent resources: 
  , , , 1, , , , , , ( ) ( ) ( ) k j M Z k j M Z k j M Z pb t V t t ω + =   (20) 
Working equations (16), (33), (34) and (35) into (36), the equilibrium probabilities of 
innovation (Z=I) and imitation (Z=F) are: 
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Plugging these equations in (14), each firm’s equilibrium R&D capital is: 
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Total R&D capital in each country is: 
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Aggregate Quality Indexes Behavior 
Following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, Ch. 7), we derive the laws of motion of  , ( ) L Z Q t  and 
, ( ) H Z Q t   These  variables  definition  says  that  in  case  of  a  quality  improvement  in  j,  the 
proportional change in the quality grade is (
1 1
γ
γ − − q ). Equations (37) and (38) imply that the 
equilibrium R&D probability per period is equal across intermediate goods. The expected 
proportional change in  , ( ) M Z Q t  is then  , M Z pb (
1 1
γ
γ − − q ). The number of intermediate goods 
being large enough, according to the Law of Large Numbers, the average growth rate of  , M Z Q  
is close to  , M Z pb (
1 1
γ
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3.3. Steady State Equilibrium 
Let us now derive the steady-state growth rate, interest rate, technological-knowledge bias, 
technological-knowledge gap, probability of successful R&D, final-good prices, and the skill 
premium for the innovator and the imitator countries separately.
1 
 
Steady State Common Features 
In equilibrium, all macroeconomic aggregates grow at the same constant rate,  Z g : 
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which implies: (i) a constant equilibrium technological-knowledge bias,  ˆ
z Q ; (ii) a constant 
probability of successful R&D for both technologies – given (42) and (43): 
  , , = ≡ L Z H Z Z pb pb pb   (31) 
Considering  (37)  and  (38),  a  constant  steady-state  probability  of  successful  R&D 
implies constant equilibrium values for the interest rate, the final-good prices, and  , M Z Φ  . 
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  (32) 
Equations (45) and (48) give us each country’s economic growth rate. 
                                                           
1 Since all these variables are constant in steady-state, the time index t will be suppressed. 17 
 
Steady State in the Innovator Country 
Equalizing (37) and (38) and using (47), the equilibrium technological-knowledge bias in I is: 
 







  (33) 
Plugging (49) into (23), (24), (32), (37) and (38), we obtain country I’ equilibrium values for 
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Equation (52) shows an important result of our model: The equilibrium skill premium in 
country I does not depend on labor supply. It depends solely and positively on the productive 
advantage of skilled over unskilled labor. This result has two important implications. Firstly, 
it means that, considering (32), the immediate effect on wages resulting from changes in the 
labor  supply  is  exactly  offset  by  changes  in  the  demand  resulting  from  technological-
knowledge progress. Secondly it suggests that the sustained increase in the skill premium in 
several developed countries may be due to increases in the relative productive advantage of 
skilled labor, rather than to increases in its relative supply.
2 
Recalling that 
1 (1 )( 1)
γ
γ ε
− = + − I I g q pb , replacing I pb  by (53) and considering (45), we 
derive country I’s equilibrium growth rate and interest rate, by solving the system:
3 
                                                           
2 This result does not imply that the skill premium does not react to changes in the labor supply. Equation (32) 
shows that it does, during the transitional dynamics. An increase in skilled labor, for example, generates an 
immediate  fall  in  the  skill  premium  –  the  supply  effect  –  and  a  subsequent  increase  during  the  transition 
dynamics – the demand effect –, before converging to the initial steady-state level. 
3 See proof of the existence of steady-state in the appendix. 18 
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This system yields the following implicit expression for the steady-state growth rate: 
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Steady State in the Imitator Country 
The equilibrium in the imitator country is determined considering four conditions: 
(i)  Both  technologies  have  equal  imitation  probability–  see  (47).  Hence  the  equilibrium 
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%   (42) 
Equations (55) to (58) show that the technological-knowledge bias, final-good prices 
and  wage  inequality  in  country  F  depend  on  the  same  variables  as  in  country  I.  Due  to 
technological-knowledge diffusion, they also depend on  %
H Q  and  %




ε + in (55) involves determining the values of  %
H Q  and  %
L Q , constant in steady-state.  
(ii)  Due to technological-knowledge diffusion, the equilibrium growth and interest rates are 
the  same  in  both  countries,  and  determined  by  country  I.  Since  condition
1 (1 )( 1) I F g q pb
γ
γ ε
− = + −  must hold, given equations (37) and (38), we have: 19 
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1 1
1 1 1 1 1
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γ
ε
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+ −
+ − − − − Ψ = −  is a positive constant and  I F g g g = ≡  is 
determined by equation (54). 
(iii) Definitions of technological-knowledge bias and technological-knowledge gap, imply: 
  ˆ ˆ
I H F L Q Q Q Q = % %   (45) 
(iv) As the technological-knowledge bias is higher in country I, equation (61) implies: 
  ˆ ˆ
I F L H Q Q Q Q > ⇔ > % %   (46) 
4. Steady State Effects 
We now examine the response of the relevant variables
4 in both countries to changes in the: 
(i)  skilled  labor  supply  in  I;  (ii)  investment  cost  parameter,  ϕ ;  (iii)  degree  of 
complementarities  between  intermediate  goods,  φ ;  (iv)  nature  of  the  two  countries 
interaction.  With  Case  (i)  we  compare  the  proposed  model  with  other  skill-biased 
technological-change models regarding the effects on the skill premium of an increase in the 
skilled  labor  supply.  With  Cases  (ii),  (iii)  and  (iv),  we  examine  the  effects  on  the  skill 
premium and growth of the three introduced assumptions. 
 
4.1. An Increase in the Skilled Labor Supply in Country I 
Proposition 1.1: If, ceteris paribus, the skilled labor supply in country I, HI, increases, the 
technological-knowledge bias in this country,  ˆ
I Q , will increase, and the skill premium,  ˆ
I W , 
remains unchanged. The growth rate in both countries, g, will increase. 
Proof: See appendix. 
 
                                                           
4 That is, technological-knowledge bias, technological-knowledge gap, growth rate and skill premium. 20 
 
Proposition 1.2: If, ceteris paribus, the skilled labor supply in country I, HI, increases, the 
technological-knowledge bias in F,  ˆ
F Q , will increase and the H-technological-knowledge gap, 
%
H Q , will decrease. The L-technological-knowledge gap,  %
L Q , and the skill premium in F,  ˆ
F W , 
may either increase or decrease. 
Proof: See appendix. 
Due to the market-size channel, an increase in the skilled labor supply in I raises its 
steady-state probability of innovation, thus accelerating the technological-knowledge progress 
and  growth.  Moreover,  it  affects  the  technological-knowledge  bias,  both  positively  (by 
making R&D investment in the H-technology more attractive) and negatively (by raising the 
prices of the final goods using this type of technology). Since the former mechanism (market-
size channel) is stronger than the latter (price channel), the net effect on the technological-
knowledge bias will be positive. This positive effect, in turn, translates into an increased 
demand for skilled labor. According to our model, such an increase exactly offsets the initial 
reduction in the supply, hence the stead-state skill premium does not change. 
An increase in the skilled labor supply in I also affects the steady-state in F, as, due to 
technological-knowledge diffusion, the growth rate of the latter is determined by that of the 
former.  Besides,  technological-knowledge  progress  in  the  new  steady-state  is  also  more 
biased  towards  the  H-technology.  This  increase  in  the  technological-knowledge  is  less 
pronounced in F, as can be seen by the reduction in  %
H Q . Due to the indefinite effect on  %
L Q , it 
is not possible to predict the final effect on the skill premium in F. 
 
4.2. An Increase in the Internal Investment Cost in Country I 21 
 
Proposition 2.1: If, ceteris paribus, the investment cost parameter, ϕ , increases in country I, 
both the technological-knowledge bias,  ˆ
I Q , and the skill premium,  ˆ
I W , in this country remain 
unchanged. The growth rate in both countries, g, will fall.
5 
Proof: Similar  to  the  proof  of  Proposition  1.1.;  the  difference  being  that  we  must  now 
calculate  / ϕ dg d  and show it is lower than zero. 
Proposition 2.2: If, ceteris paribus, the investment cost parameter, ϕ , increases in country I, 
the technological-knowledge bias in F,  ˆ
F Q , will fall and both technological-knowledge gaps, 
%
L Q and  %
H Q , will increase. Thus, the skill premium in F,  ˆ
F W , may either increase or decrease.
6 
Proof: See appendix. 
An increase in ϕ in I raises the marginal cost of producing intermediate goods, thereby 
reducing intermediate firms profits, deeming successful innovation less likely. The common 
growth rate will hence decrease. Despite not affecting the technological-knowledge bias nor 
the skill premium in I – see (49) and (52) –, this change affects such variables in F through 
international  diffusion.  In  particular,  given  (59)  and  (60)  and  due  to  the  backwardness 
hypothesis, a fall in the growth rate and consequently in the imitation probability, implies a 
smaller technological-knowledge gap between the two countries, hence the rise in  %
H Q  and  %
L Q  
The effect on the skill premium in F will be indeterminate. Besides, since  %
L Q  increases more 
than  %
H Q , and  ˆ
I Q  remains constant, the technological-knowledge bias in F,  ˆ
F Q , will decrease. 
 
4.3. An Increase in the Degree of Complementarities in Country I 
                                                           
5 If we considered instead an increase in the internal cost of investment in F, the effects would be a maintenance 
of not only  ˆ
I Q  and  ˆ
I W , but also g. 




L Q  and  %
H Q
would be exactly the opposite. 22 
 
Proposition 3.1: If, ceteris paribus, the degree of complementarities between intermediate 
goods, φ , increases in I, both the technological-knowledge bias,  ˆ
I Q , and the skill premium, 
ˆ
I W , remain unchanged. The growth rate in both countries, g, increases.
7 
Proof: Similar to the proof of Propositions 1.1. and 2.1.; only now we must now calculate 
/ ε dg d  and show it is higher than zero (a higher value of φ implies a higher value of ε). 
 
Proposition 3.2: If, ceteris paribus, the degree of complementarities between intermediate 
goods,  φ ,  increases  in  I,  the  technological-knowledge  bias  in  F,  ˆ
F Q ,  will  increase  and 
technological-knowledge gaps,  %
L Q and  %
H Q , will decrease. Thus, the skill premium in F,  ˆ
F W , 
may either increase or decrease.
8 
Proof: Similar to the proof of Proposition 2.2., with all variables varying in the opposite way. 
An increase in the degree of complementarities (an increase in ε) between intermediate 
goods  in  I  affects  growth  positively,  via  two  channels.  Firstly,  a  higher  degree  of 
complementarities  raises  the  total  demand  of  intermediate  goods,  thereby  raising  global 
output – this effect is captured by (48). Secondly, as (37) and (38) show, it also raises the 
steady-state  innovation  probability  as  well  as  the  aggregate  quality  indexes’  growth  rate, 
thereby fostering technological progress. 
Given (59) and (60) and due to the backwardness hypothesis, a rise in the global growth 
rate  and,  thus,  in  the  imitation  probability,  implies  a  wider  technological-knowledge  gap 
between I and F, hence the fall in  %
H Q  and  %
L Q . Since  %
L Q decreases more than  %
H Q  ,and  ˆ
I Q  
remains constant, the technological-knowledge bias in F,  ˆ
F Q , will increase. 
 
                                                           
7 If we considered instead an increase in the degree of complementarities between intermediate goods in P, the 
effects would be a maintenance of not only  ˆ
I Q  and  ˆ
I W , but also g. 
8 If we considered instead an increase in the degree of complementarities between intermediate goods in F, the 
effects on  ˆ
F Q ,  %
L Q and  %
H Q  would be exactly the opposite. 23 
 
4.4. Effects of Technological Knowledge Diffusion 
Proposition 4.1: The introduction of technological-knowledge diffusion does not alter the 
steady-state  values  of  the  technological-knowledge  bias,  ˆ
I Q ,  the  skill  premium,  ˆ
I W ,  and 
growth rate, gI, in country I. 
Proof: Since the world growth rate is determined by I and there is not any feedback effect 
from F, the steady-state values of all variables in the former are the same with and without 
technological-knowledge diffusion. 
Proposition  4.2:  Technological-knowledge  diffusion  raises  the  steady-state  values  of  the 
technological-knowledge bias,  ˆ
F Q , skill premium,  ˆ
F W , and growth rate, gF, in country F. 
Proof: Without technological-knowledge diffusion, firms in F cannot imitate the innovations 
of I, thus F behaves as an innovator. Therefore, all the relevant steady-state expressions for F 
are given by equations (49)-(54), with index I replaced by F. Given that:  > % %
L H Q Q ;  I F A A > ; 
h l > ; and  / / I I F F H L H L > , technological-knowledge diffusion increases: (a) F’s  growth 
rate – in (54), g is higher when Z=I than when Z=F –; (b) the technological-knowledge bias, 
which is evident by the comparison of (49), for Z=F, with (55); and (c) the skill premium, 
which is evident by comparison of (52), for Z=F, with (58). 
With technological-knowledge diffusion, technological-knowledge progress in F will be 
more H-biased. This has two consequences: Firstly, it raises the skill premium. Secondly, it 
raises  the  country’s  growth  rate.  Thus,  only  F  benefits  with  technological-knowledge 
diffusion, as the growth rate in I remains unaffected. Moreover, since it brings about steady 
state  growth  rates  equalization  between  countries,  diffusion  causes  convergence.  But  this 
convergence occurs only in growth rates, not in levels, because technological-knowledge in F 
will remain lower than that of I. Our model then predicts that international technological-
knowledge diffusion brings about conditional convergence. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
We have developed a dynamic  general-equilibrium model with growth driven by vertical 
R&D that includes three elements of contemporary economies: internal costly investment in 
both physical capital and R&D, complementarities between intermediate goods in production, 
and technological-knowledge diffusion between innovator and imitator countries. 
Our  first  finding  is  that  an  increase  in  the  skilled  labor  supply,  an  increase  in  the 
complementarities  degree,  and  a  decrease  in  the  internal  investment  cost  have  a  positive 
impact  on  the  innovator  country’s  long-term  growth.  However,  they  do  not  affect  the 
equilibrium skill premium which depends solely on the productivity of each type of labor.  
In fact, our model carries a proposed contribution to the technological-knowledge bias 
literature, predicting that changes in the relative supply of skilled workers do not affect the 
skill premium in the innovator country in steady-state, since the immediate effect resulting 
from a change in the supply is exactly offset by the subsequent effects resulting from changes 
in demand. This result suggests that the sustained increase in the skill premium observed in 
several developed countries may be due to increases in the relative productive advantage of 
skilled labor, rather than to increases in its relative supply. 
Our findings for the imitator country are that, due to technological-knowledge diffusion, 
the three introduced economic features influence the steady-state growth rate, skill premium, 
technological-knowledge  bias,  and  the  technological-knowledge  gaps.  Moreover, 
technological-knowledge diffusion is beneficial for the imitator country, as it brings about 
world growth rates equalization. As the imitation cost is lower than the innovation cost, the 
imitator country’s technological-knowledge level tends, however, to remain lower than the 
innovator’s. Diffusion enables conditional convergence between countries. 
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Consider  the  system  that  determines  the  equilibrium  values  of  r  and  g  and  investigate,  for  each 
equation, the signal of  / dg dr : 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 (1 )( 1) 1 (1 )
γ γ α ε
γ γ α α α
ρ
θ
ε β ζ α ϕ
− + −
− − − − − − −
−  = 

  
 = + − − + + −  
     
I I I I I
r
g
g q e q q A hH lL g r r
 








. Regarding the second equation, let’s define G1 as: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 (.) (1 )( 1) 1 (1 ) I I I I I G1 g q e q q A hH lL g r r
γ γ α ε
γ γ α α α ε β ζ α ϕ
− + −
− − − − − − −  
= − + − − + + −  
   
 
Using the Implicit Function Theorem: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1
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dg r g r
G1 dr
q hH lL g r g
γ γ α










− − − −
− −
− − −
   
∂ + − + + − Ψ + +         −     ∂ = − = − < ∀ >
∂  
+ + − Ψ + +   ∂   −  
 
The second equation is negatively sloped in the first quadrant of the space (g,r), while the first is 
positively sloped, hence there is a unique combination of positive values of g and r such that both 
equations are simultaneously satisfied. 
 
Proof of proposition 1.1. 
Regarding an increase in  ˆ
I Q  and the maintenance of  ˆ
I W , proof is immediate by inspection of (49) and 
(52). Concerning the increase in g, proof relies on the determination of the signal of  / dg dH . From 
(54), let’s define G2 as: 
( )( )
2 1 1 (.) (1 )( 1) I I I I I G2 g q h H l L g g g g
γ α
γ α ε θ θϕ ρ ρϕ θ ρ
−
− −  
= − + − Ψ + + + + − −  
 
 
Using the Implicit Function Theorem: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 1 1
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 
∂ − + − + + + Ψ    
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∂       −   − − + − + + − Ψ + + + + + +         ∂     −          
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Proof of proposition 1.2. 
Consider  (59)  and  (60).  To  examine  the  effects  on  ˆ
F Q ,  %
L Q and  %







F L Q t












F H Q t




%  – the only endogenous components in (59) and 
(60), apart from g – change in the face of an increase in g. Starting with (59), define G3 as: 
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these increases can result from different combinations of prices,  , L F P  and  , H F P  paths and functions 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
F L Q t
F L f Q t
σ %
%   and  ( )
( ) ( )
( )
F H Q t
F H f Q t
σ %
% ,  we  must  investigate  which  combinations  are  possible, 
considering that the four conditions for the determination of the equilibrium in F are satisfied. 
￿  Result 1.2.A:  ( )
( ) ( )
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H Q  (given that  (.) F f  is a decreasing function of  % Q ) 
-  ( )
( ) ( )
, ( )
F H Q t










F H Q t







F ↓Q  (eq. 24) 
-  , ˆ
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rises) ⇒ L Q ↓ %  
Under this scenario,  ˆ
F Q  and  %
L Q decrease and  ˆ
I Q  and  %
H Q  increase. However, such a scenario is 
not possible, as (61) is not satisfied. 27 
 
 
￿  Result 1.2.B:  , L F P  must rise 
If  , L F P  
falls, the following will occur:  
-  , ˆ
L F F P ↓ ⇒↓Q
 
(eq. 23) 
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%  (from Result 1.2.A) ⇒ H Q ↓ %  
Under this scenario,  ˆ
F Q ,  %
L Q and  %
H Q ,decrease and  ˆ
I Q  increases. Therefore, (61) is satisfied only 
if  %
H Q  falls more than  %
L Q , and (55) is satisfied only if  ( )
( ) ( )
( )
F L Q t
F L f Q t
σ %
%  increases more than 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
F H Q t
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σ %
% .  Given  the  configuration  of  ( )
( ) ( )
( )
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and  ( )
( ) ( )
( )
F H Q t
F H f Q t
σ %
% ,  these 
conditions are simultaneously satisfied only if the initial level of  %
H Q  is higher than the initial 
level of  %
L Q . Since it violates (62), this scenario is also not possible. 
 
￿  The only possible final effects are:  ˆ
F Q ↑ , ↓ %
H Q , ↑↓ %
L Q .  
From Results 1.2.A and 1.2.B, the following must occur: 
-  ( )
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L F F P ↑ ⇒ ↑ Q
 
(eq. 23)  , H F P ⇒↓ (eq. 24) 
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must increase,  ( )
( ) ( )
( )
F L Q t
F L f Q t
σ %
% can 
either increase or decrease. In the first case,  %
L Q   and  %
H Q  decrease and  ˆ
I Q  and  ˆ
F Q  increase. In 
the second case,  %
H Q  decrease and  %
L Q ,  ˆ
I Q  and  ˆ
F Q  increase. Both scenarios are possible, as (55), 
(61), (62) are satisfied. Thus, given (58), the skill premium may either increase or decrease. 
 
Proof of proposition 2.2. 
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decrease. Thus, we can derive the following results: 
￿  Result 2.2.A:  ( )
( ) ( )
( )
F H Q t





If  ( )
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F H Q t
F H f Q t
σ %
%  rises, the following will occur:  
-  ( )
( ) ( )
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H Q  (given that  (.) F f  is a decreasing function of  % Q ) 28 
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F ↑Q  (eq. 24) 
-  , ˆ
F L F Q P ↑ ⇒↑ (eq. 23) ( )
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rises) ⇒ L Q ↑ %  
Under this scenario,  %
H Q  decreases,  ˆ
F Q  and  %
L Q  increase and  ˆ
I Q  remains unchanged. Such a 
scenario is not possible, however, as (55) is not satisfied. 
 
￿  Result 2.2.B:  , L F P  must fall 
If  , L F P  
rises, the following will occur:  
-  , ˆ
L F F P ↑ ⇒↑Q
 
(eq. 23) 
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rises) ⇒ L Q ↑ %  
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%  (from Result 2.2.A) ⇒ H Q ↑ %  
Thus, under this scenario,  %
H Q ,  %
L Q  and  ˆ
F Q  increase and  ˆ
I Q  remains unchanged. Therefore, (61) 
is satisfied only if  %
H Q  increases more than  %
L Q , and (55) is satisfied only if  ( )
( ) ( )
( )
F L Q t
F L f Q t
σ %
%  falls 
more than  ( )
( ) ( )
( )
F H Q t
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σ %
% . Given the configuration of  ( )
( ) ( )
( )
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and  ( )
( ) ( )
( )
F H Q t
F H f Q t
σ %
% , 
these conditions are simultaneously satisfied only if the initial level of  %
H Q  is higher than the 
initial level of  %
L Q . As it violate (62), this scenario is not possible either. 
 
￿  The only possible final effects are:  ˆ
F Q ↓ , ↑ %
H Q , ↑ %
L Q . 
From Results 2.2.A and 2.2.B, the following must occur: 
-  ( )
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(eq. 23)  , H F P ⇒↑  (eq. 24) 
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must  decrease,  ( )
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can either increase or decrease. In the first case,  %
L Q  and 
ˆ
F Q  decrease,  %
H Q  increases, and  ˆ
I Q  
remains still, which is impossible as it does not satisfy (61). In the second case,  ˆ
F Q  decreases, 
%
L Q   and  %
H Q  increase and  ˆ
I Q  remains constant. Under this scenario, (61) is satisfied only if  %
L Q  
increases  more  than  %
H Q ,  and  (55)  is  satisfied  only  if  ( )
( ) ( )
( )
F L Q t
F L f Q t
σ %
%   falls  more  than 
( )
( ) ( )
( )
F H Q t
F H f Q t
σ %
% . Given the configuration of  ( )
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and  ( )
( ) ( )
( )
F H Q t
F H f Q t
σ %
% , these two 29 
 
conditions are simultaneously satisfied only if the initial level of  %
H Q  is lower than the initial level 
of  %
L Q , which is compatible with (62). This is the only scenario for which conditions (55) to (62) 
are all satisfied. Consequently, given (58), the skill premium may either increase or decrease. 
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